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Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints:
A Complete Computational Trichotomy
Matthias Mnich∗ Ildiko´ Schlotter †
Abstract
We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant
of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we
seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of the distinguished
people. We investigate how a set of natural parameters, namely the maximum length of
preference lists for men and women, the number of distinguished men and women, and the
number of blocking pairs allowed determine the computational tractability of this problem.
Our main result is a complete complexity trichotomy that, for each choice of the stud-
ied parameters, classifies SMC as polynomial-time solvable, NP-hard and fixed-parameter
tractable, or NP-hard and W[1]-hard. We also classify all cases of one-sided constraints
where only women may be distinguished.
1 Introduction
The Stable Marriage (SM) problem is a fundamental problem first studied by Gale and
Shapley [18] in 1962. An instance of SM consists of a set M of men, a set W of women, and a
preference list for each person ordering members of the opposite sex. We aim to find a stable
matching, i.e., a matching for which there exists no pair of a man and a woman who prefer each
other to their partners given by the matching; such a pair is called a blocking pair.
We consider a problem that we call Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints
(SMC). Here, a setW⋆ of women and a setM⋆ of men are distinguished, and a feasible matching
is one where each person in W⋆ ∪ M⋆ gets matched. By the Rural Hospitals Theorem [19]
we know that the set of unmatched men and women is the same in all stable matchings, so
clearly, feasible stable matchings may not exist. Thus, we define the task in SMC as finding
a feasible matching with a minimum number of blocking pairs. Somewhat surprisingly, this
natural extension of SM has not been considered before.
1.1 Motivation
Our main motivation for studying SMC—apart from its natural definition—is its close rela-
tionship with the Hospitals/Residents with Lower Quota (HRLQ) problem, modelling a
situation where medical residents apply for jobs in hospitals: residents rank hospitals and vice
versa, and hospitals declare both lower and upper quotas which bound the number of residents
they can accept; the task is to find an assignment with a minimum number of blocking pairs.
By the frequently applied method of “cloning” hospitals, HRLQ reduces to the case where each
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hospital has unit upper quota. In fact, this is equivalent to the special case of SMC where
only women (or, equivalently, men) are distinguished. We refer to this problem with one-sided
covering constraints, linking SMC and HRLQ, as SMC-1.
The HRLQ problem and its variants have recently gained quite some interest from the
algorithmic community [4, 7, 15, 21, 23, 25, 29, 36, 40]. In his book, Manlove [33, Chapter 5.2]
devotes an entire chapter to the algorithmics of different versions of the HRLQ problem.
The reason for this interest in HRLQ is explained by its importance in several real-world
matching markets [16, 17, 38] such as school admission systems, centralized assignment of
residents to hospitals, or of cadets to military branches. Lower quotas are a common feature
of such admission systems. Their purpose is often to remedy the effects of understaffing that
are explained by the well-known Rural Hospitals Theorem [19]: as an example, governments
usually want to assign at least a small number of medical residents to each rural hospital
to guarantee a minimum service level. Minimum quotas are also discussed in controlled school
choice programs [12, 32, 39] where students are divided into a small number of types, and schools
set lower bounds for each type. Such models can represent various forms of affirmative actions
taken by schools to, e.g., admit a certain number of minority students [12]. Another example
is the German university admission system for admitting students to highly oversubscribed
subjects, where a certain percentage of study places is assigned according to high school grades or
waiting time [39]. But lower quotas may also arise due to financial considerations: for instance,
a business course with too few (tuition-paying) attendees may not be profitable. Certain aspects
of airline preferences for seat upgrade allocations can be also modelled by lower quotas [32].
Another motivation for studying the SMC problem comes from the following scenario that
we dub Control for Stable Marriage. Consider a two-sided market where each participant of the
market expresses its preferences over members of the other party, and some central agent (e.g.,
a government) performs the task of finding a stable matching in the market. It might happen
that this central agency wishes to apply a certain control on the stable matching produced:
it may favour some participants by trying to assign them a partner in the resulting matching.
Such a behaviour might be either malicious (e.g., the central agency may accept bribes and thus
favour certain participants) or beneficial (e.g., it may favour those who are at disadvantage, like
handicapped or minority participants). However, there might not be a stable matching that
covers all participants the agency wants to favour; thus arises the need to produce a matching
that is as stable as possible among those that fulfil our constraints—the most natural aim in
such a case is to minimize the number of blocking pairs in the produced matching, which yields
exactly the SMC problem. Similar control problems for voting systems have been extensively
studied in the area of social choice following the work initiated by Bartholdi III. et al. [3], but
have not yet been considered in connection to stable matchings.
1.2 Our Results
We provide an extensive algorithmic analysis of the SMC problem and its special case SMC-1.
In our analysis, we examine how different aspects of the input influence the tractability of these
problems. To this end, we apply the framework of parameterized complexity, which deals with
computationally hard problems and focuses on how certain parameters of a problem instance
influence its tractability; for background, we refer to the book by Cygan et al. [10]. We aim to
design so-called fixed-parameter algorithms, which perform well in practice if the value of the
parameter on hand is small (for the precise definitions, see Sect. 2).
The parameters we consider are
• the number b of blocking pairs allowed,
• the number |W⋆| of women with covering constraint,
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• the number |M⋆| of men with covering constraint,
• the maximum length ∆W of women’s preference lists, and
• the maximum length ∆M of men’s preference lists.
The choice of each of these parameters is motivated by the aforementioned applications. For
instance, we seek matchings where ideally no blocking pairs at all or at least only few of them
appear, to ensure stability of the matching and happiness of those getting matched. The
number of women/men with covering constraints corresponds, for instance, to the number of
rural hospitals for which a minimum quota specifically must be enforced, which we can expect
to be small among the set of all hospitals accepting medical residents. Finally, preference lists
of hospitals and residents can be expected to be small, as each hospital might not rank many
more candidates than the number of positions it has to fill, whereas residents might rank only
their top choices of hospitals.
We investigate in detail how these parameters influence the complexity of the SMC problem.
A parameterized restriction of SMC with respect to the set S = {b, |W⋆|, |M⋆|,∆M,∆W}means
a (possibly parameterized) special case of SMC where each element of S is either restricted to be
some constant integer, or regarded as a parameter, or left unbounded. Intuitively, these different
choices for the elements of S correspond to their expected “range” in applications, from very
small to mid-range to large (compared to the size of the entire system). By considering all
combinations, we can flexibly model the whole range of applications mentioned above.
Theorem 1. Any parameterized restriction of SMC with respect to {b, |W⋆|, |M⋆|,∆M,∆W}
is in P, or NP-hard and fixed-parameter tractable, or NP-hard and W[1]-hard with the given
parameterization1 , and is covered by one of the results shown in Table 1.
In particular, SMC is W[1]-hard parameterized by b+|W⋆|, even if there are no distinguished
men (i.e., |M⋆| = 0), there is a master list over men as well as one over women, ∆M = 3,
∆W = 3 and each distinguished woman finds only a single man acceptable.
A decision diagram in Section 7 shows that the presented results indeed cover all restrictions
of SMC with respect to the set {b, |W⋆|, |M⋆|,∆M,∆W}. Table 1 summarizes our results on
the complexity of SMC. Note that some results are implied directly by the symmetrical roles of
men and women in SMC, and thus are not stated explicitly.
As a special case, we answer a question by Hamada et al. [23] who gave an exponential-time
algorithm that in time O(|I|b+1) decides for a given instance I of HRLQ whether it admits a
feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs2; the authors asked whether HRLQ is fixed-
parameter tractable parameterized by b. As shown by Theorem 1, SMC-1 and therefore also
HRLQ is W[1]-hard when parameterized by b, already in a very restricted setting. Thus, the
answer to the question by Hamada et al. [23] is negative: SMC-1, and hence HRLQ, admits no
fixed-parameter algorithm with parameter b unless FPT = W[1].
1.3 Related Work
There is a dynamically growing literature on matching markets with lower quotas [4, 7, 15, 16,
17, 21, 23, 25, 29, 36, 40]. These papers study several variants of HRLQ, adapting the general
model to the various specialties of practical problems. However, there are only a few papers
which consider the problem of minimizing the number of blocking pairs [16, 23]. The most
1Restrictions without any parameters are simply classified as polynomial-time solvable or NP-hard.
2Hamada et al. claim only a run time O((|W||M|)b+1), but their algorithm can easily be implemented to run
in time O(|I |b+1).
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constants parameters complexity
|M⋆| = 0, |W⋆| = 0 in P (Gale-Shapley alg.)
|M⋆| = 0, |W⋆|,∆M in P (Thm. 7)
|M⋆|, |W⋆|,∆M,∆W in P (Thm. 7)
|M⋆| = 0,∆M ≤ 2 in P (Thm. 8)
∆W ≤ 2,∆M ≤ 2 in P (Observ. 2)
b in P (Observ. 1)
|M⋆| = 0,∆W ≤ 2,∆M ≥ 3 NP-hard (Thm. 9)
|W⋆| = 1,∆W ≤ 2,∆M ≥ 3 NP-hard (Thm. 10)
|M⋆| = 0,∆W ≥ 3,∆M ≥ 3,∆⋆ = 1 b+ |W⋆| W[1]-hard (Thm. 2)
|M⋆| = 0, |W⋆| ≥ 1,∆W ≥ 3,∆⋆ = 1 b+∆M W[1]-hard (Thm. 5)
∆W ≤ 2 |W⋆|+ |M⋆| FPT (Thm. 11)
∆W ≤ 2 b FPT (Cor. 3)
Table 1: Summary of our results for Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints.
Here, ∆⋆ denotes the maximum length of the preference list of any distinguished person.
closely related work to ours is the paper by Hamada et al. [23]: they prove that the HRLQ
problem is NP-hard and give strong inapproximability results; they also consider the SMC-1
problem directly and propose an O(|I|b+1) time algorithm for it.
A different line of research connected to SMC is the problem of arranged marriages, an
early extension of SM suggested by Knuth [30] in 1976. Here, a set Q⋆ of man-woman pairs is
distinguished, and we seek a stable matching that contains Q⋆ as a subset. Thus, as opposed to
SMC, we not only require that each distinguished person is assigned some partner, but instead
prescribe its partner exactly. Initial work on arranged marriages [22, 30] was extended by Dias
et al. [11] to consider also forbidden marriages, and was further generalized by Fleiner et al. [14]
and Cseh and Manlove [9]. Despite the similar flavour of the studied problems, none of these
papers have a direct consequence on the complexity of SMC.
Our work also fits into the line of research that addresses computationally hard problems in
the area of stable matchings by focusing on instances with bounded preference lists [6, 26, 28,
31, 37] or by applying the more flexible approach of parameterized complexity [1, 2, 5, 34, 35].
Organization. After the preliminaries in Sect. 2, we start with the main intractability result
in Sect. 3, which answers Hamada et al.’s question. This result shows W[1]-hardness of SMC
parameterized by b + |W⋆| even when M⋆ = ∅ and ∆M = ∆W = 3. Thus, we explore three
directions to achieve tractability: (i) to lower b to be a constant, (ii) to lower |W⋆| to be a
constant, or (iii) to lower either ∆W or ∆M to 2. We cover the cases (i) and (ii) in Sect. 5,
and case (iii) in Sect. 6. In addition, Sect. 4 provides polynomial-time approximation results
for HRLQ and SMC, used also in the polynomial-time algorithms of Sect. 5.
2 Preliminaries
An instance I of the Stable Marriage (SM) problem consists of a setM of men and a setW
of women. Each person x ∈ M∪W has a preference list L(x) that strictly orders the members
of the other party acceptable for x. We thus write L(x) as a vector L(x) = (y1, . . . , yt), denoting
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that yi is (strictly) preferred by x over yj for each i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t. A matching M
for I is a set of man-woman pairs appearing in each other’s preference lists such that each
person is contained in at most one pair of M ; some persons may be left unmatched by M . For
each person x we denote by M(x) the person assigned by M to x. For a matching M , a man m
and a woman w included in each other’s preference lists form a blocking pair if (i) m is either
unmatched or prefers w to M(m), and (ii) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M(w). In the
Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC) problem, we are given additional
subsets W⋆ ⊆ W and M⋆ ⊆ M of distinguished people that must be matched; a matching M
is feasible if it matches everybody in W⋆ ∪ M⋆. The objective of SMC is to find a feasible
matching for I with minimum number of blocking pairs. If only people from one gender are
distinguished, then without loss of generality, we assume these to be women; this special case
will be denoted by SMC-1.
The many-to-one extension of SMC-1 is the Hospitals/Residents with Lower Quotas
(HRLQ) problem whose input consists of a set R of residents and a set H of hospitals that
have ordered preferences over the acceptable members of the other party. Each hospital h ∈ H
has a quota lower bound q(h) and a quota upper bound q(h), which bound the number of
residents that can be assigned to h from below and above. One seeks an assignment M that
maps a subset of the residents to hospitals that respects acceptability and is feasible, that is,
q(h) ≤ |M(h)| ≤ q(h) for each hospital h. Here, M(h) is the set of residents assigned to
some h ∈ H by M . We say that a hospital h is under-subscribed if |M(h)| < q(h). For an
assignment M of an instance of HRLQ, a pair {r, h} of a resident r and a hospital h is blocking
if (i) r is unassigned or prefers h to the hospital assigned to r by M , and (ii) h is under-
subscribed or prefers r to one of the residents in M(h). The task in HRLQ is to find a feasible
assignment with minimum number of blocking pairs.
Some instances of SMC may admit a master list over women, which is a total ordering LW
of all women, such that for each man m ∈ M, the preference list L(m) is the restriction of LW
to those women that m finds acceptable. Similarly, we consider master lists over men.
With each instance I of SMC (or HRLQ) we can naturally associate a bipartite graph GI
whose vertex partitions correspond to M and W (or R and H, respectively), and there is an
edge between a man m ∈ M and a woman w ∈ W (or between a resident r ∈ R and a hospital
h ∈ H, respectively) if they appear in each other’s preference lists. We may refer to entities
of I as vertices, or a pair of entities as edges, without mentioning GI explicitly.
Parameterized complexity. The framework of parameterized complexity deals with com-
putationally hard problems, examining their complexity in a more detailed way than classical
complexity theory. In a parameterized problem problem Π, each input instance I is associated
with an integer k called the parameter. An algorithm which decides instances I of Π in time
f(k) · |I|O(1) for some computable function f is called a fixed-parameter algorithm. Note that
the dependence of the polynomial in the run time is constant, but the dependence on the pa-
rameter k can be arbitrary (and is typically exponential). However, if the parameter of a given
instance is small, then such an algorithm can be useful in practice even if the overall size of the
instance is large.
The class of problems admitting fixed-parameter algorithms is denoted by FPT. To argue
that a problem is not in FPT, parameterized complexity provides a hardness theory. For two
parameterized problems Π1 and Π2, a parameterized reduction from Π1 to Π2 is a function f ,
computable by a fixed-parameter algorithm, that maps each instance (I1, k1) of Π1 to an instance
f(I1, k1) = (I2, k2) of Π2 such that (i) (I1, k1) is a “yes”-instance of Π1 if and only if (I2, k2) is a
“yes”-instance of Π2, and (ii) k2 ≤ g(k2) for some function g. The basic class of parameterized
intractability is W[1]: proving a problem Π to be W[1]-hard is strong evidence that Π /∈ FPT.
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Given some problem Π that is known to be W[1]-hard, a parameterized reduction from Π to
some parameterized problem Π′ implies W[1]-hardness of Π′ as well.
For more on parameterized complexity, we refer the reader to the book by Cygan et al. [10].
3 Strong Parameterized Intractability of SMC
This section provides parameterized intractability and inapproximability results for SMC show-
ing the hardness of finding feasible matchings with minimum number of blocking pairs.
Theorem 2. SMC-1 is W[1]-hard parameterized by b+ |W⋆|, even if there is a master list over
men as well as one over women, all preference lists are of length at most 3, and |L(w)| = 1 for
each woman w ∈ W⋆.
Proof. We give a reduction from the W[1]-hard Multicolored Clique parameterized by the
size of the solution [13]. Let G be the input graph, with its vertex set partitioned into k sets
V1, . . . , Vk; the task is to find a clique of size k in G containing exactly one vertex from each of
the sets Vi. We let Ei,j denote those edges that run between Vi and Vj for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
We fix an ordering on the vertices and edges of G that places vertices of Vi before vertices
of Vj whenever i < j. We will write succ(x) to denote the vertex following x in this ordering,
and we let v1i and v
∞
i denote the first and last vertices in Vi, respectively. Similarly, we write
succ({x, y}) for the edge following {x, y}, and we let e1i,j and e
∞
i,j denote the first and last
edges in Ei,j, respectively. We will also write pred(x) and pred({x, y}) for the predecessor of x
or {x, y}, respectively. Also, we denote the h-th neighbor of some vertex x as n(x, h). For
simplicity, we assume that there is no isolated vertex in G.
We construct an instance I of SMC as follows; see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for an illustration.
We set the number of blocking pairs allowed for I to be b = 2k +
(k
2
)
. Together with the
instance I, we will define a stable matching Ms for I as well, and for each woman w of I, we
will denote the man Ms(w) by wˆ. Some women will need “dummy” partners in their preference
lists: we denote the dummy of w by w˜. The dummy w˜ will always appear as the last item on
w’s preference list, and its preference list will always be L(w˜) = (w).
For each i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we construct an edge selecting gadget Gi,j that involves
women si,j and ti,j, together with women a{x,y}, bx→y, and by→x for each edge {x, y} ∈ Ei,j . All
women in Gi,j are matched by Ms except for si,j, and Gi,j contains the man wˆ for each of these
women w, together with additional dummies b˜y→x for each {x, y} ∈ Ei,j with x preceding y.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we also construct a node selecting gadget Gi involving women si, ti,
and u1i , . . . , u
b+1
i , together with women ax, b
1
x, . . . , b
d(x)
x , and c1x, . . . , c
b+1
x for each x ∈ Vi. The
men in Gi include wˆ for each woman w of Gi except for si, and additional dummies b˜
1
x, . . . , b˜
d(x)
x
and c˜b+1x for each x ∈ Vi.
We define the following sets of women:
A = {ax | x ∈ V (G)} C={c
h
x | x ∈ V (G), 1 ≤ h ≤ b+ 1}
A′= {a{x,y} | {x, y} ∈ E(G)} S={si | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {si,j | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k}
B = {bhx | x ∈ V (G), 1 ≤ h ≤ d(x)} T={ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {ti,j | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k}
B′= {bx→y, by→x | {x, y} ∈ E(G)} U={uhi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ h ≤ b+ 1}
To define the set W⋆ of women in I with covering constraint we let W⋆ = S ∪ T ∪ U ;
note |W⋆| = 2
(k
2
)
+ 2k + k(
(k
2
)
+ 2k + 1). The finish the definition of I, we define the precise
structure of these gadgets as well as the connections between them by the preference lists shown
in Tables 2 and 3; when not stated otherwise, indices take all possible values.
For simplicity, we write b0x = ax, b
d(x)+1
x = c1x, and c
0
x = b
d(x)
x for any vertex x ∈ V (G).
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si
2 1 2 1
3
...
aˆx
2 1
ax2 1
3
. . .
bˆ1x
1
3
2
b1x
1
2
3
bˆ2x
1
3
2
b2x
1
2
3
...
bˆ
d(x)
x 1
3
2
b
d(x)
x 1
2
3
2 1 2 1
3
...
2 1 ti
...
1
2
1 2
3
cˆ1x 1
32 c1x
1 2
3
1
32
...
1 2
3
. . .
1
2
1 2
3
cˆ2x1
32 c2x
1 2
3
1
32
1 2
3
. . .
...
...
...
1
2
cˆb+1x c
b+1
x
. . .
c˜b+1x
1
32
...
1 2
3
1 2
u1i
1
32
1 2
3
1 2
u2i
...
. . .
uk
′+1
i
Figure 1: Node selecting gadget Gi in the proof of Theorem 2.
sij
2 1 2
1
3
...
2 1
a{x,y}
2
1
3
bˆx→y
1
2
bx→y1
3
2
bˆhx
bˆy→x
1
2
by→x1
3 2
bˆℓy
b˜x→y
. . .
2 1 2
1
3
...
2 1
tij
Figure 2: Edge selecting gadget Gi,j in the reduction of Theorem 2.
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Table 2: Preference lists of women and men in node selecting gadgets.
L(ax) = (aˆsucc(x), aˆx, bˆ
1
x), where x ∈ Vi \ {v
∞
i },
L(ax) = (tˆi, aˆx, bˆ
1
x), where x = v
∞
i ,
L(bhx) = (bˆ
h
x, bˆ
h+1
x , b˜
h
x),
L(chx) = (cˆ
h
x, cˆ
h
succ(x), cˆ
h+1
x ), where 1 ≤ h ≤ b, x ∈ Vi \ {v
∞
i },
L(chx) = (cˆ
h
x, uˆ
h
i , cˆ
h+1
x , ), where 1 ≤ h ≤ b and x = v
∞
i ,
L(cb+1x ) = (cˆ
b+1
x , cˆ
h
succ(x), c˜
b+1
x ), where x ∈ Vi \ {v
∞
i },
L(cb+1x ) = (cˆ
b+1
x , uˆ
b+1
i , c˜
b+1
x , ), where x = v
∞
i ,
L(si) = (aˆx), where x = v
1
i ,
L(ti) = (tˆi),
L(uhi ) = (uˆ
h
i ),
L(aˆx) = (ax, apred(x)), where x ∈ Vi \ {v
1
i },
L(aˆx) = (ax, si), where x = v
1
i ,
L(bˆhx) = (b
h−1
x , bx→y, bhx), where y = n(x, h), x ∈ Vi, y ∈ Vj and i < j
L(bˆhx) = (b
h−1
x , by→x, bhx), where y = n(x, h), x ∈ Vi, y ∈ Vj and i > j
L(cˆhx) = (c
h−1
x , c
h
pred(x), c
h
x), where x ∈ Vi \ {v
1
i },
L(cˆhx) = (c
h−1
x , c
h
x), where x = v
1
i ,
L(tˆi) = (ti, ax), where x = v
∞
i ,
L(uˆhi ) = (c
h
x, u
h
i ), where x = v
∞
i ,
L(w˜) = (w), for any dummy woman w˜.
Table 3: Preference lists of women and men in edge selecting gadgets.
L(a{x,y}) = (aˆsucc({x,y}), aˆ{x,y}, bˆx→y), where {x, y} ∈ Ei,j \ {e∞i,j , } and x precedes y,
L(a{x,y}) = (tˆi,j , aˆ{x,y}, bˆx→y), where {x, y} = e∞i,j and x precedes y,
L(bx→y) = (bˆx→y, bˆhx, bˆy→x), where y = n(x, h) and x precedes y in V (G),
L(by→x) = (bˆy→x, bˆhy , b˜y→x), where y = n(x, h) and x precedes y in V (G),
L(si,j) = (aˆ{x,y}), where {x, y} = e1i,j,
L(ti,j) = (tˆi,j),
L(aˆ{x,y}) = (a{x,y}, apred({x,y})), where {x, y} ∈ Ei,j \ {e1i,j},
L(aˆ{x,y}) = (a{x,y}, si,j), where {x, y} = e1i,j,
L(bˆx→y) = (a{x,y}, bx→y), where x precedes y in V (G),
L(bˆy→x) = (bx→y, by→x), where x precedes y in V (G),
L(tˆi,j) = (ti,j , a{x,y}), where {x, y} = e∞i,j,
L(w˜) = (w), for any dummy woman w˜.
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Let us define a master list LW over all women as follows. The first women in LW are those
in T , in any ordering. They are followed by women in A, ordered according to the reversed
ordering over V (G), that is, ax precedes ay exactly if y precedes x. Next follow women of A
′,
ordered according to the reversed ordering over E(G). Next come women in B ∪B′. To order
them, we first order those in B by putting bhx before b
ℓ
y in LW if and only if x precedes y or x = y
and h < ℓ, then for each edge {x, y} ∈ E(G) with x preceding y, y = n(x, h) and x = n(y, ℓ)
we insert bx→y just before bhx, and we insert by→x just before bℓy, thus determining the ordering
of B ∪ B′. After women in B ∪B′ come women of C, with chx preceding cℓy exactly if h < ℓ or
h = ℓ and x precedes y. We finish the definition of the master list LW by putting all women in
S ∪ U at the end of LW in an arbitrary order.
The master list over men is derived from LW by letting wˆ1 precede wˆ2 whenever w1 pre-
cedes w2 in LW , and adding all dummies at the end in an arbitrary order. It is easy to check
that the preference lists given in Tables 2 and 3 are indeed compatible with these master lists.
This completes the construction of the instance.
We are going to prove that the constructed instance I admits a feasible assignment with at
most b blocking pairs if and only if there is a clique of size k in the graph G.
”⇒”: Suppose there is a feasible matching M of men to women with at most b blocking
pairs. Let G∆ be the symmetric difference M△Ms. Notice that for each woman s ∈ S, the
difference G∆ must contain exactly one path containing s as its endpoint, since the women in S
must be matched in M , but are unmatched in Ms. Similarly, no path of G∆ can contain a
woman in T ∪ U . We call a path P in G∆ with an endpoint s in S an augmenting path. We
say that P starts at s and ends at its other endpoint, and we refer to that path starting at si
(or si,j) as Pi (or Pi,j , respectively).
We define the cost of some path P of G∆ as the number of blocking pairs {m,w} for M
involving a woman w that appears on P . Since Ms is stable, it should be clear that each
augmenting path contains at least one edge that is blocking for M , so each path in G∆ has cost
at least 1. As there are exactly k +
(k
2
)
augmenting paths (as all women in S must be matched
by M), we get a minimum cost of k +
(k
2
)
. Note also that the total cost of all paths in G∆
cannot exceed b = 2k +
(
k
2
)
. Claim 1 is therefore crucial.
Claim 1. The following holds for any augmenting path P of G∆:
• P cannot end at a dummy c˜b+1x for some x ∈ V (G).
• P contains an edge {a, aˆ} for some a ∈ A ∪A′ that blocks M .
• If P is not disjoint from Gi for some i, then P has cost at least 2.
Proof of Claim 1. To prove (a), suppose for contradiction that P ends at c˜b+1x , where x ∈ Vi.
Clearly, P must contain at least one woman from each of the b + 1 sets {chv | v ∈ Vi}, h =
1, . . . , b+1. Fix h, and let us consider the last v ∈ Vi for which c
h
v is incident to an edge of G∆.
Let w = chsucc(v) if v 6= v
∞
i , or otherwise let w = u
h
i . Then the edge {c
h
v , w} yields a blocking
pair in M , as M(w) = Ms(w) = wˆ, and thus wˆ prefers c
h
v to w. This reasoning gives us b + 1
different blocking pairs for M , one for each index h, contradicting our assumption on M .
To prove (b), let us consider the case when P = Pi for some i; the argument goes the same
way for the case where P = Pi,j for some i and j. If P ends at ax for some x ∈ Vi, then ax
forms a blocking pair with aˆx in M . If P does not end at a woman in A, then it must contain
the edge {ax, b
1
x} for some x, in which case {ax, aˆx} is again blocking in M , showing (b).
To see (c), first observe that if P is not disjoint from Gi, then P ends in Gi, simply because
of its property that it contains edges from M and Ms in an alternating fashion. Therefore, the
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last woman w on P must be in B ∪ C. If w = bhx for some b ∈ B, then the edge {b
h
x, bˆ
h+1
x }
is blocking M , as bhx cannot get its first choice bˆ
h
x in M (and bˆ
h+1
x cannot be on P , as that
would imply that bh+1x is on P , contradicting the choice of w). If, by contrast, w = c for some
c ∈ C, then P must end at w by (a), and then c forms a blocking pair with the third man in
its preference list (for whom c is the first choice). In either case, w is involved in a blocking
pair, which together with the blocking pair guaranteed by (b) implies that P has cost at least 2.
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 1 proves that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} the augmenting path Pi has cost at least 2.
Since all the remaining
(k
2
)
augmenting paths have cost at least 1, and the total cost of these
paths must be at most b = 2k +
(
k
2
)
, we get that any path Pi (or Pi,j) must have cost exactly 2
(or 1, respectively). Furthermore, it also follows that no other path of G∆ can enter or start
in Gi, for any i, as that would imply that the number of blocking pairs for M is more than b.
In addition, it is not hard to see that G∆ does not contain any cycle, because all cycles in the
graph underlying I contain two consecutive edges not in Ms. Hence, it follows that the only
connected component in G∆ that is not disjoint from Gi is Pi.
To deal with the possibly courses the path Pi may take for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let xi denote
the vertex in Vi for which {axi , aˆxi} is the blocking edge guaranteed by statement (b) of Claim 1.
Observe that Pi either ends at axi or contains the edge {axi , bˆ
1
xi}. In either case, we say that Pi
selects xi from Vi; clearly, there can be only one vertex in Vi selected by Pi.
Consider now Pi,j for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. Recall that Pi,j has cost 1. Therefore, state-
ment (b) of Claim 1 proves that the only blocking edge incident to some woman on Pi,j must be
{a{x,y}, aˆ{x,y}} for some {x, y} ∈ Ei,j. We say that Pi,j selects the edge {x, y}; without loss of
generality, let us assume that x precedes y. By statement (c) of Claim 1, we also know that Pi,j
cannot leave Gi,j , which means that it can only have cost 1 if it ends at b˜y→x. In particular, it
contains the edges {bx→y, bˆy→x} and {by→x, b˜y→x}. Observe that the edge {bx→y, bˆhx} where h
is such that y = n(x, h) cannot be blocking in M (as this would indicate a cost of 2 for Pi,j),
yielding that bˆhx must be matched to b
h−1
x in M . By the arguments of the previous paragraph,
this means that Pi must contain the subpath (ax, bˆ
1
x, b
1
x, . . . , bˆ
h
x, b
h
x). Hence, we obtain that x
must be selected by Pi. Similarly, from the fact that the edge {by→x, bˆℓy} where x = n(y, ℓ) is
not blocking in M we get that y must be selected by Pj .
Thus, we obtain that if an edge is selected by Pi,j for some i and j, then its endpoints must
be selected by Pi and Pj. As this must hold for each pair of indices with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we
obtain that there must be
(k
2
)
edges in G whose endpoints are among the k selected vertices.
This can only happen if these edges are the edges of a clique of size k.
”⇐”: Suppose now that G has a clique of size k formed by the vertices x1, . . . , xk, with
xi ∈ Vi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Instead of directly defining the required matching M that
is feasible and admits at most b blocking pairs, we give Ms△M as the union of paths Pi for
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and paths Pi,j for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, defined as follows.
We set Pi as the path
Pi = (si, aˆv1
i
, av1
i
, . . . , aˆxi , axi , bˆ
1
xi , b
1
xi , . . . , bˆ
d(xi)
xi , b
d(xi)
xi , b˜
d(xi)
xi ) .
Similarly, we define
Pi,j = (si,j, aˆe1i,j
, ae1i,j
, . . . , aˆ{xi,xj}, a{xi,xj}, bˆxi→xj , bxi→xj , bˆxj→xi, bxj→xi , b˜xj→xi) .
It is straightforward to verify that the blocking pairs for M are then the k edges {axi , aˆxi},
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the k edges {b
d(xi)
xi , c
1
xi}, and the
(k
2
)
edges {a{xi,xj}, aˆ{xi,xj}}, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. The
feasibility of M is trivial; this completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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A fundamental hypothesis about the complexity of NP-hard problems is the Exponential
Time Hypothesis (ETH), which stipulates that algorithms solving all Satisfiability instances
in subexponential time cannot exist [27]. Assuming ETH, the fundamental Clique problem
parameterized by solution size k was shown not to admit any algorithm giving the correct answer
in time f(k) ·no(k) for all n-vertex instances and any computable function f [8, Thm. 5.4]. The
known reduction from Clique to Multicolored Clique does not change the parameter [13].
Finally, in the proof of Theorem 2, an instance of Multicolored Clique with solution size k
is reduced to an instance of SMC-1 with parameter b = O(k2).
Corollary 1. Assuming ETH, SMC-1 cannot be solved in time f ′(b) ·no(
√
b) for any computable
function f ′, even if there is a master list over men and over women, all preference lists have
length at most 3, and each woman in W⋆ finds only a single man acceptable.
4 Polynomial-Time Approximation
Here we first provide a polynomial-time algorithm that yields a (∆R−1)qΣ-factor approximation
for HRLQ. Then we use this result to propose a polynomial-time algorithm for HRLQ for the
case where both the maximum length ∆R of residents’ preference lists and the total sum qΣ of
all lower quotas is constant. Recall that in HRLQ, our objective is to find an assignment that
satisfies all quota lower and upper bounds and minimizes the number of blocking pairs.
Theorem 3. Let I be an instance I of HRLQ, and q
Σ
the sum of lower quota bounds taken
over all hospitals in I. There is an algorithm that in polynomial time either outputs a feasi-
ble assignment for I with at most (∆R − 1)qΣ blocking pairs, involving only qΣ residents, or
concludes that no feasible assignment exists.
Proof. We start by finding an assignmentMq that assigns q(h) residents to each hospital h ∈ H
⋆,
and has the following property:
for each hospital h ∈ H⋆, all residents that are preferred by h to the least preferred
resident in Mq(h) are contained in
⋃
h′∈H⋆\{h}Mq(h
′). (†)
Such an assignment can be obtained as follows. We start from an arbitrary assignment M
that assigns q(h) residents to each h ∈ H⋆ (if no such assignment exists, then we can stop and
reject); such an assignment, if existent, can be found in polynomial time by an algorithm of
Hopcroft and Karp [24]. Then we greedily re-assign residents to hospitals of H⋆, one-by-one:
at each step, we take a hospital h ∈ H⋆, and if there exists a resident r not assigned to any
other hospital in H⋆ that h prefers to the least preferred resident r′ in M(h), then we replace r′
with r in M(h). If this step cannot be applied anymore, then we arrive at an assignment Mq
with the desired property (†).
Given Mq, we reduce the upper quotas of each hospital h ∈ H
⋆ by q(h), set all lower quotas
to 0, and delete all residents in R⋆ := Mq(H⋆). We then find a stable assignment Ms in
the resulting instance I ′; note that I ′ is an instance of HR, so we can find Ms in polynomial
time [18]. Finally, we outputMout =Ms∪Mq. Clearly, M
out is feasible. Also, any blocking pair
that Mout admits must involve either a hospital from H⋆ or a resident from R⋆ = Mq(H
⋆) by
the stability of Ms with respect to I
′. Observe that if some h ∈ H⋆ is involved in some blocking
pair {r, h} of Mout, then we must have r ∈ R⋆. To see this, recall that each resident that is
preferred by h to its least preferred resident in Mq(h) must be in R
⋆ because of property (†),
and furthermore, h is under-subscribed in Mout (within I) if and only if h is under-subscribed
in Ms (within I
′). Therefore, we can conclude that each blocking pair for Mout must involve
some resident in R⋆; recall |R⋆| ≤ q(h). Since each resident in R⋆ is incident to at most ∆R−1
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edges not inMout, we also have thatMout admits at most (∆R−1)|R⋆| ≤ (∆R−1)q(h) blocking
pairs.
If both ∆R and qΣ are constant, then Theorem 3 implies that HRLQ becomes polynomial-
time solvable. Indeed, we can use the following simple strategy, depending on the number b of
blocking pairs allowed: if b ≥ (∆R−1)qΣ, then we apply Theorem 3 directly; if b < (∆R−1)qΣ,
then we use the algorithm by Hamada et al. [23] running in time O(|I|b+1) which is polynomial,
since b is upper-bounded by a constant.
Corollary 2. If both the maximum length ∆R of residents’ preference lists and the total sum qΣ
of all lower quotas is constant, then HRLQ is polynomial-time solvable.
Another application of Theorem 3 is an approximation algorithm that works regardless of
whether ∆R or qΣ is a constant. In fact, the algorithm of Theorem 3 can be turned into a
(∆R − 1)qΣ-factor approximation algorithm as follows. First, we find a stable assignment Ms
for I in polynomial time using the extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Hospi-
tals/Residents problem. If Ms is not feasible, then by the Rural Hospitals Theorem [19],
we know that any feasible assignment for I must admit at least one blocking pair; hence, the
algorithm presented in Theorem 3 clearly yields an approximation with (multiplicative and also
additive) factor (∆R − 1)qΣ.
To close this section, we also state an analogue of Theorem 3 that deals with SMC: it can
handle covering constraints on both sides, but assumes that all quota upper bounds are 1.
Theorem 4. There is an algorithm that in polynomial time either outputs a feasible matching
for an instance I of SMC with at most (∆W−1)|M⋆|+(∆M−1)|W⋆| blocking pairs, or concludes
that no feasible matching exists for I.
Proof. We start by finding an arbitrary matching M that covers each distinguished person (if
no such matching exists, then we can stop and reject); such a matching, if existent, can be
found in polynomial time by standard flow techniques. We assume, without loss of generality,
that each edge in M is incident to some distinguished person. Let us define X ⋆ = W⋆ ∪M⋆,
and let U⋆ be the set of those persons x ∈ X ⋆ whose partner M(x) is also in X ⋆.
We proceed by modifying M into a matching Mq that covers X
⋆ and has the following
property:
If a person x ∈ X ⋆ \ U⋆ belongs to a blocking pair {x, y} for Mq, then Mq(y) ∈ X
⋆. (z)
Such an assignment can be obtained as follows. We greedily re-assign partners to the men and
women in X ⋆ \ U⋆, one-by-one: at each step, we take a person x ∈ X ⋆ \ U⋆, and if x forms a
blocking pair (with respect to the current matching) with some y that is not the partner of a
distinguished person, then we replace the partner of x with y: we add the edge {x, y} to the
matching, and delete all the other edges incident to x or y. Observe that the obtained matching
is still feasible. If this step cannot be applied anymore, then we arrive at a matching Mq with
the desired property (z); note also that each edge in Mq is incident to some distinguished
person.
Given Mq, we delete all men and women covered byMq. We then find a stable matching Ms
in the resulting instance I ′; note that I ′ is an instance of Stable Marriage, so we can findMs
in polynomial time [18]. Finally, we output Mout = Ms ∪Mq. Clearly, M
out is feasible. Also,
any blocking pair that Mout admits must involve a person covered by Mq due to the stability
of Ms with respect to I
′.
We claim that any blocking pair {x, y} involves a person whose partner by Mq is distin-
guished, so either Mq(x) ∈ X
⋆ or Mq(y) ∈ X
⋆. We can assume that x is covered by Mq
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(because this holds for at least one of x and y). To see the claim, first note that if x is not dis-
tinguished, thenMq(x) must be distinguished, because each edge ofMq contains a distinguished
person. Second, if x ∈ X ⋆, then either x ∈ U⋆ (in which case Mq(x) ∈ X
⋆) or Mq(y) ∈ X
⋆
because of property (z). Therefore, we can conclude that each blocking pair for Mout must
involve the partner of some distinguished resident. The partners of distinguished women can be
incident to at most |W⋆|(∆M − 1) blocking pairs, and similarly, the partners of distinguished
men can be incident to at most |M⋆|(∆W − 1) blocking pairs, proving the theorem.
5 SMC with Bounded Number of Distinguished Persons or
Blocking Pairs
In Theorem 2 we proved W[1]-hardness of SMC-1 for the case where ∆M = ∆W = 3, with
parameter b+ |W⋆|. Here we investigate those instances of SMC and SMC-1 where the length
of preference lists may be unbounded, but either b, or the number of distinguished persons is
constant.
First, if the number b of blocking pairs allowed is constant, then SMC can be solved by
simply running the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm after guessing and deleting all blocking
pairs. This complements the result by Hamada et al. [23].
Observation 1. SMC can be solved in time O(|I|b+1), where b denotes the number of blocking
pairs allowed in the input instance I.
In Theorem 5 we prove hardness of SMC-1 even if only one woman must be covered. If we
require preferences to follow master lists, then a slightly weaker version of Theorem 5, where
|W⋆| = 2, still holds.
Theorem 5. SMC-1 is W[1]-hard parameterized by b+∆M, even if W⋆ = {s}, ∆W = 3, and
|L(s)| = 1.
Proof. We present a reduction based on the one from Multicolored Clique given in the
proof of Theorem 2. Given some graph G and an integer k as inputs, we are going to re-use the
instance I constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. Recall that I has a feasible matching with
at most b =
(k
2
)
+ 2k blocking pairs exactly if G has a clique of size k. Recall also that the set
of women that must be covered in I is S ∪ T ∪ U ; here we denote this set by W⋆I . We define
s t
aw
2
3
1
a′w1
2
bw2
1
b′w
3
1
2
cw
2 3
1 c′w
2
2
dw
2
1
d′w
3
1 2
w
2
3
1
u(w)
Figure 3: Illustration depicting the forcing gadget Fw in the proof of Theorem 5.
a modified instance I ′ of SMC as follows. For each w ∈ W⋆I , we create a forcing gadget Fw
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containing the newly introduced women aw, bw, cw, dw and men a
′
w, b
′
w, c
′
w, d
′
w. We also add the
distinguished woman s, who must be covered in I ′, and the unique man t in L(s). See Fig. 3
for an illustration.
Let n(w) denote the unique man acceptable for some w ∈ W⋆I in I. Additionally, we let
Y = {aw, cw | w ∈ W
⋆
I }, and we write [Y ] for an arbitrarily fixed ordering of the elements of Y .
The preferences of the newly introduced men and women, as well as the modified preferences
of those agents that find them acceptable, is given below. Here, again, indices take all possible
values, and w can be any woman in W⋆I . We let I
′ contain all other women and men defined
in I, having the same preferences as in I.
L(s) = (t), L(t) = ([Y ], s),
L(aw) = (b
′
w, t, a
′
w), L(a
′
w) = (aw, dw),
L(bw) = (c
′
w, b
′
w), L(b
′
w) = (bw, w, aw),
L(cw) = (d
′
w, t, c
′
w), L(c
′
w) = (cw, bw),
L(dw) = (a
′
w, d
′
w), L(d
′
w) = (dw, w, cw),
L(w) = (n(w), b′w, d′w).
We will show that I ′ has a feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs if and only if I
has such a matching; this clearly proves the theorem.
First observe that any feasible matching M ′ for I ′ contains the edge {s, t}. Thus, if some
woman y in Y is not matched by M ′ to her first choice, then {y, t} is blocking in M ′. Consider
now Fw for some w ∈ W
⋆
I . It is straightforward to check that if M
′(w) 6= n(w), then there are
at least two blocking pairs incident to a woman in Fw. Indeed, assume first that {t, aw} is the
only blocking pair in Fw; this quickly implies M
′(cw) = d′w and M ′(b′w) = w, which in turn
leads to {aw, b
′
w} blocking M
′, a contradiction. Second, assume that {t, aw} does not block M ′;
from this follows M ′(aw) = b′w and we have that {b′w, w} is a blocking pair for M ′. Now either
{t, cw} is blocking (in which case our claim holds), or we get M
′(cw) = d′w, which implies that
{d′w, s} blocks M ′, again a contradiction.
Now, let Wi be the women in Gi that must be covered in I, i.e., Wi = {si, ti, u
1
i , . . . , u
b+1
i }.
Consider the number βi of blocking pairs for M
′ that involve a woman either in the gadget Gi
or in a gadget Fw for some w ∈ Wi. On the one hand, if some w ∈ Wi is not matched by M
′
to n(w), then βi ≥ 2 because of the blocking pairs in Fw. On the other hand, if each w ∈ Wi is
matched by M ′ to n(w), then using the arguments of the proof for Theorem 2, we again know
βi ≥ 2 because of the blocking pairs in Gi. Also, βi = 2 can only be achieved if (i)M
′(ti) = n(ti),
as otherwise {ti, n(ti)} would be blocking for M
′, in addition to the two blocking pairs in Fti ,
and (ii) M ′(uhi ) = n(u
h
i ) for each h ∈ {1, . . . , b+1}, as otherwise we would have M
′(si) = n(si)
(so as to avoid having four blocking pairs due to women in Fuhi
and Fsi), implying at least one
blocking pair in Gi in addition to those in Fuhi
.
Analogously, let βi,j denote the number of blocking pairs forM
′ that involve a woman either
in the gadget G{i,j} or in a gadget Fw for some w ∈ {si,j, ti,j}. Then either βi,j ≥ 2, or we know
that M ′(w) = n(w) for both women w ∈ {si,j , ti,j}; in this case, from the proof of Theorem 2
we get βi,j ≥ 1. However, supposing that M
′ has at most b = 2k+
(k
2
)
blocking pairs, it follows
that βi = 2 and βi,j = 1 must hold for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k,
respectively.
Along the same lines as in the proof of Theorem 2, it can also be verified that βi,j = 1 for
each pair of indices i, j can only be achieved ifM ′△Ms contains a path in each gadget Gi. From
M ′(w) = n(w) for each w ∈ Wi \ {si} we get that such a path contains at least one blocking
pair. This implies M ′(si) = n(si), as otherwise we would end up with βi ≥ 3 because of the
blocking pairs incident to women of Fsi .
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Altogether, we have proved that M ′(w) = n(w) for each w ∈ W⋆I . Hence, the restriction
of M ′ to I yields a feasible matching for I that admits at most b blocking pairs.
For the other direction, suppose that I has a feasible matching M . Then it is easy to see
that adding the edges {aw, b
′
w}, {bw, c
′
w}, {cw, d
′
w}, and {dw, a
′
w} for each w ∈ W
⋆
I together with
the edge {s, t} to M yields a feasible matching for I ′ that contains exactly the same number of
blocking pairs in I ′ as M does in I.
Theorem 6. SMC-1 is W[1]-hard parameterized by b+∆M, even if there is a master list over
men as well as one over women, |W⋆| = 2, ∆W ≤ 3, and |L(w)| = 1 for each w ∈ W⋆.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Theorem 5, so we will only sketch it. Again,
we are going to re-use the instance I constructed in the proof of Theorem 2, and construct a
modified instance I ′ of SMC, adding only two new women z1 and z2 and two men m1 and m2
to I. We append z1 and z2, in this order, to the master list over women, and similarly, we
append m1,m2 to the master list over men. We define the women to be covered in I
′ as z1
and z2.
Again, we denote the set of women to be covered in I by W⋆I , and we denote by n(w) the
unique man acceptable for some w ∈ W⋆I in I. The preferences of the newly introduced men and
women, as well as the modified preferences of those agents that find them acceptable, is given
below (here, [W⋆I ]≺ denotes the ordering of W
⋆
I given by the master list). We let I
′ contain all
other women and men defined in I, having the same preferences as in I.
L(z1) = (m1), L(m1) = ([W
⋆
I ]≺, z1),
L(z2) = (m2), L(m2) = ([W
⋆
I ]≺, z2),
L(w) = (n(w),m1,m2) ∀w ∈ W
⋆
I .
Arguing analogously as before in the proof of Theorem 5, one can show that I ′ has a feasible
matching with at most b blocking pairs if and only if I has such a matching; this suffices to
prove the theorem.
To contrast our intractability results, we show next that if each of |W⋆|, |M⋆|, ∆W , and ∆M
is constant, then SMC becomes polynomial-time solvable. Our algorithm relies on the ob-
servation that in this case, the number of blocking pairs in an optimal solution is at most
(∆M − 1)|W⋆| + (∆W − 1)|M⋆| by Theorem 4. Note that for instances of SMC-1, Theorem 7
yields a polynomial-time algorithm already if both |W⋆| and ∆M are constant.
Theorem 7. SMC can be solved in time O(|I|(∆M−1)|W⋆|+(∆W−1)|M⋆|+1).
Proof. By Theorem 4, there is a matching with at most bmax = (∆M− 1)|W⋆|+(∆W − 1)|M⋆|
blocking pairs. Hence, if the number b of blocking pairs allowed is at least bmax, then we can
simply run the algorithm of Theorem 4. Otherwise, we can use Observation 1, which gives us
the required run time.
Importantly, restricting only three of the values |W⋆|, |M⋆|, ∆W , and ∆M to be constant
does not yield tractability for SMC, showing that Theorem 7 is tight in this sense. Indeed,
Theorem 5 implies immediately that restricting the maximum length of the preference lists on
only one side still results in a hard problem: SMC remains W[1]-hard with parameter b+∆M,
even if ∆W = 3, |W⋆| = 1, and |M⋆| = 0. On the other hand, Theorem 2 shows that the
problem remains hard even if ∆W = ∆M = 3 and |M⋆| = 0.
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6 SMC with Preference Lists of Length at most Two
In this section we investigate the computational complexity of SMC where the maximum length
of preference lists is bounded by 2 on one side. This restriction leads to important tractable spe-
cial cases: we obtain both polynomial-time algorithms and fixed-parameter tractability results
for various parameterizations.
Let I be an instance of SMC with underlying graph G. LetMs be a stable matching in I, and
letM⋆0 andW
⋆
0 denote the set of distinguished men and women, respectively, unmatched byMs.
Furthermore, let M0 and W0 denote the set of all men and women, respectively, unmatched
by Ms. A path P in G is called an augmenting path, if Ms∆P is a matching, and either both
endpoints of P are in M⋆0 ∪W
⋆
0 , or one endpoint of P is in M
⋆
0 ∪W
⋆
0 , and its other endpoint
is not distinguished. We will call an augmenting path P masculine or feminine if it contains a
man in M⋆0 or a woman in W
⋆
0 , respectively; if P is both masculine and feminine, then we call
it neutral. If P is not neutral, then we say that it starts at the (unique) person from M⋆0 ∪W
⋆
0
it contains, and ends at its other endpoint.
6.1 Covering constraints on one side
Here we deal with the SMC-1 problem where only women need to be covered. We first give
a polynomial-time algorithm for SMC-1 when each man finds at most two women acceptable,
and then show NP-hardness of SMC-1 for instances where each woman finds at most two men
acceptable. We start by considering the special case of SMC-1 where ∆M ≤ 2.
Theorem 8. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for the special case of SMC-1 where each
man finds at most two women acceptable.
High-level description. The main observation behind Theorem 8 is that if ∆M ≤ 2, then
any two augmenting paths starting from different women in W⋆0 are almost disjoint, namely
they can only intersect at their endpoints. Thus, we can modify the stable matching Ms by
selecting augmenting paths starting from each woman in W⋆0 in an almost independent fashion:
intuitively, we simply need to take care not to choose paths sharing an endpoint—a task which
can be managed by finding a bipartite matching in an appropriately defined auxiliary graph.
To ensure that the number of blocking pairs in the output is minimized, we will assign costs
to the augmenting paths. Roughly speaking, the cost of an augmenting path P determines
the number of blocking pairs introduced when modifying Ms along P (though certain special
edges need not be counted); hence, our problem reduces to finding a bipartite matching with
minimum weight in the auxiliary graph.
To present the algorithm of Theorem 8 in detail, we start with the following properties of
augmenting paths which are easy to prove using that ∆M ≤ 2:
Proposition 1. Let P1 and P2 be augmenting paths starting at w1 and w2, respectively.
(a) If w1 6= w2, then P1 and P2 are either vertex-disjoint, or they both end at some m ∈ M0,
with V (P1) ∩ V (P2) = {m}.
(b) If there is an edge {m,w} of G (with m ∈ M and w ∈ W) connecting P1 and P2, then
m ∈ M0 and P1 or P2 must end at m.
(c) If w1 = w2 and P is the maximal common subpath of P1 and P2 starting at w1, then either
V (P1) ∩ V (P2) = V (P ), or P1 and P2 both end at some m ∈ M0 and V (P1) ∩ V (P2) =
V (P ) ∪ {m}.
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With a set P of edges (typically a set of augmenting paths) where Ms△P is a matching,
we associate a cost, which is the number of blocking pairs that Ms△P admits. A pair {m,w}
for some m ∈ M and w ∈ W is special, if m ∈ M0 and w is the second (less preferred) woman
in L(m). As it turns out, such edges can be ignored during certain steps of the algorithm; thus,
we define the special cost of P as the number of non-special blocking pairs in Ms△P .
Lemma 1. For vertex-disjoint augmenting paths P1 and P2 with costs c1 and c2, resp., the cost
of P1∪P2 is at most c1+c2. Further, if the cost of P1∪P2 is less than c1+c2, then the following
holds for {i1, i2} = {1, 2}: there is a special edge {m,w} with Pi1 ending at m and w appearing
on Pi2 ; moreover, {m,w} is blocking in Ms△Pi2 , but not in Ms△(P1 ∪ P2).
Proof. First observe that if some edge {m,w} has a common vertex with only one of the paths P1
and P2, say P1, then {m,w} is blocking in Ms△P1 if and only if it is blocking in Ms△(P1∪P2).
Consider now the case when {m,w} connects P1 and P2. By Proposition 1, this implies that
one of the paths, say P1, ends at m ∈ M0 (and w lies on P2). Clearly, {m,w} is not blocking
in Ms△P1, by the stability of Ms. If, on the one hand, w is the first choice of m, then {m,w}
is blocking in Ms△P2 exactly if it is blocking in Ms△(P1 ∪ P2). If, on the other hand, {m,w}
is special, then it cannot be blocking in Ms△(P1 ∪ P2), but it might be blocking in Ms△P2.
Putting all these facts together, the lemma follows immediately.
We are ready to provide the algorithm, in a sequence of four steps.
Step 1: Computing all augmenting paths. By Proposition 1, if we delete M0 from the
union of all augmenting paths starting at some w ∈ W⋆0 , then we obtain a tree. Furthermore,
these trees are mutually vertex-disjoint for different starting vertices of W⋆0 . This allows us to
compute all augmenting paths in linear time, e.g., by an appropriately modified version of the
DFS algorithm (so that only augmenting paths are considered). During this process, we can
also compute the special cost of each augmenting path in a straightforward way.
Step 2: Constructing an auxiliary graph. Using the results of the computation of Step 1,
we construct an edge-weighted single bipartite graph Gpath as follows. The vertex set of Gpath is
the union ofW⋆0 andM0∪{w
′ | w ∈ W⋆0}, so for each woman w ∈ W
⋆
0 we create a corresponding
new vertex w′. We add an edge between w ∈ W⋆0 and m ∈ M0 with weight c if there exists an
augmenting path with endpoints w and m having special cost c (and no such path with lower
special cost exists). Further, for each w ∈ W⋆0 we compute the minimum special cost c
min
w of
any augmenting path starting at w and not ending in M0, and add an edge between w and w
′
with weight cminw in Gpath.
Step 3: Computing a minimum weight matching. We compute a matching MP in Gpath
covering W⋆0 and having minimum weight. Observe that such a matching corresponds to a set
of augmenting paths P = {Pw | w ∈ W
⋆
0} that are mutually vertex-disjoint by Proposition 1.
Recall that the special cost of Pw is the weight of the edge in MP incident to w.
Step 4: Eliminating blocking special edges. In this step, we modify P iteratively. We
start by setting Pact = P. At each iteration we modify Pact as follows. We check whether
there exists a special edge {m∗, w∗} that is blocking in Ms△Pact. If yes, then notice that m∗
is not matched in Ms△Pact, because {m
∗, w∗} is special and thus m∗ ∈ M0. Let P be the
path of Pact containing w
∗. We modify Pact by truncating P to its subpath between its starting
vertex and w∗, and appending to it the edge {m∗, w∗}. This way, {m∗, w∗} becomes an edge of
the matching Ms△Pact. The iteration stops when there is no special edge blocking Ms△Pact.
Note that once a special edge ceases to be blocking in Ms△Pact, it cannot become blocking
again during this process, so the algorithm performs at most |M0| iterations. For each w ∈ W
⋆
0 ,
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let P ∗w denote the augmenting path in Pact covering w at the end of Step 4; we define P∗ =
{P ∗w | w ∈ W⋆0} and output the matching Ms△P
∗.
This completes the description of the algorithm; we now provide its analysis.
Lemma 2. Msol := Ms△P
∗ is a feasible matching for I, and the number of blocking pairs
for Msol is at most the weight of MP .
Proof. Consider the situation when the iteration in Step 4 deals with a special edge {m∗, w∗}
blocking in Pact. Notice that since w
∗ is the second woman in L(m∗) (by the definition of a
special edge), and since {w∗,m∗} is blocking in Ms△Pact, we know that m∗ is unmatched in
Ms△Pact, that is, m
∗ does not lie on any of the augmenting paths in Pact. From this follows that
the augmenting paths in Pact, and hence in P
∗, remain mutually vertex-disjoint. Therefore,Msol
is indeed a matching. As it covers W⋆0 , and no augmenting path ends at a woman in W
⋆ \W⋆0 ,
matching Msol is feasible.
Clearly, Step 4 ensures that there are no blocking special edges in Msol. Note that when the
algorithm modifies Pw for some w ∈ W
⋆
0 , at most one new blocking pair may arise with respect
to Ms△Pact, and from the stability of M and Proposition 1 it follows that such an edge must
be a special edge (incident to the man at which Pw ends before its modification). This means
that Step 4 gets rid of all blocking special edges without introducing any non-special blocking
edges. Hence, we obtain that the cost of P ∗w is at most the special cost of Pw, for each w ∈ W⋆0 .
By Lemma 1, the number of blocking pairs that Msol admits is at most the sum of the costs of
all augmenting paths in P∗; this finishes the proof.
To show that our algorithm is correct and Msol is optimal, by Lemma 2 it suffices to prove
that the weight of MP is at most the number of blocking pairs in M
opt, where Mopt denotes
an optimal solution in I. To this end, we are going to define a matching covering W⋆0 in Gpath
whose weight is at most the number of blocking pairs in Mopt.
Clearly,Ms△M
opt contains an augmenting pathQw covering w for each w ∈ W
⋆
0 . If someQw
ends at a man m ∈ M0, then clearly no other path in Ms△M
opt can end at m. So let us take
the matching MQ in Gpath that includes all pairs {m,w} where Qw ends at m ∈ M0 for some
w ∈ W⋆0 . Also, we put {w,w
′} into MQ if Qw does not end at a man of M0. Note that MQ is
indeed a matching.
It remains to show that the weight of MQ is at most the number of blocking pairs in M
opt.
By definition, the weight ofMQ is at most the sum of the special costs of the paths Qw for every
w ∈ W⋆0 . By Lemma 1, any non-special blocking pair in Ms△Qw remains a blocking pair in
Ms△(
⋃
w∈W⋆
0
Qw), and hence in M
opt as well. Hence, there is a matching in Gpath with weight
at most the number of blocking pairs in an optimal solution, implying the correctness of our
algorithm. As the algorithm runs in polynomial time, Theorem 8 follows.
By contrast to Theorem 8, if men may have preference lists of length 3, then SMC-1 (and
hence SMC) is NP-hard even if each woman finds at most two men acceptable.
Theorem 9. SMC-1 is NP-hard even if ∆W = 2 and ∆M = 3.
Proof. We give a reduction from the NP-hard Vertex Cover problem, asking whether the
input graph G has a vertex cover of size at most k. We order the vertices of G arbitrarily, and
denote the h-th neighbor of some vertex x by n(x, h) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , d(x)}.
Let us construct an instance I of SMC as follows; see Fig. 4 for an illustration. For each
vertex x ∈ V (G) we construct a node gadget Gx which contains women sx, a
0
x, . . . , a
d(x)
x , c1x
and c2x, and men b
0
x, . . . , b
d(x)
x , and dx. For each edge {x, y} ∈ E(G) we also construct an edge
gadget G{x,y} involving women s{x,y}, ax→y and ay→x, and men bx→y and by→x. Furthermore,
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Gx: sx
1
2
dx 1
2
3
c1x
c2x
b0x
1
2
a0x
12
b1x1
2
3
a1x
12
b2x
ax→y
1 2
bx→y
1
2
s{x,y}
1
2
G{x,y}:
by→x
1
2 ay→x1
2
a
d(x)−1
x
12
b
d(x)
x a
d(x)
x
. . .
Figure 4: Illustration of a node gadget Gx and an edge gadget G{x,y} constructed in the proof
of Theorem 9. Double edges denote edges of a stable matching for I, and dashed edges are
those leaving some gadget. The example depicted assumes y = n(x, 2).
there are two edges in the underlying graph connecting G{x,y} to Gx and Gy, namely {ax→y, bhx}
and {ay→x, bℓy} where y = n(x, h) and x = n(y, ℓ).
The preference lists of I are given in Table 4. We define the set of women with covering
constraints as
W⋆ = {sx | x ∈ V (G)} ∪ {s{x,y} | {x, y} ∈ E(G)} ∪ {ahx | 0 ≤ h < d(x)},
and set the number of blocking pairs allowed to be |V (G)|+ k.
We are going to prove that I admits a feasible matching with at most |V (G)| + k blocking
pairs if and only if there is a vertex cover of size k in the graph G.
”⇒”: Let M be a feasible matching with at most |V (G)| + k blocking pairs. We say that
the cost of some gadget Gx (or G{x,y}) is the number of edges blocking M which are incident
to some man of Gx (or G{x,y}, respectively.) We will prove that the set S of vertices x for
which Gx has cost at least 2 is a vertex cover of G.
First, let us consider some x for which M(sx) = dx. In this case, both c
1
x and c
2
x form a
blocking pair for M with dx, implying x ∈ S. Second, let us consider some x with M(sx) = b
0
x.
Since each ahx with 0 ≤ h < d(x) must be matched by M , we obtain M(a
h
x) = b
h+1
x for each
such h. Hence, a
d(x)
x and b
d(x)
x form a blocking pair for M . Moreover, if the woman ax→y is
unmatched in M for some y, then {ax→y, bhx} is also a blocking pair in M (where y = n(x, h)),
and implies a cost of at least 2 for Gx. Therefore, we can observe that if x /∈ S, then ax→y must
be matched by M to bx→y for each neighbor y of x in G.
However, for any {x, y} ∈ E(G), M must match s{x,y} either to bx→y or to by→x, which
means that x ∈ S or y ∈ S. This proves that S is indeed a vertex cover for G. Moreover,
the number of vertices in S can be at most k, since each Gx with x ∈ S has cost at least 2,
each Gx with x /∈ S has cost at least 1, and the total cost of all gadgets cannot exceed our
budget |V (G)|+ k.
”⇐”: Given a vertex cover S of size at most k for G, we define a matching M with the
desired properties. Namely, for each x ∈ S we set M(sx) = dx and M(a
h
x) = b
h
x for each
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Table 4: Preference lists of women and men in the proof of Theorem 9. When not stated
otherwise, indices take all possible values.
L(sx) = (b
0
x, dx),
L(b0x) = (a
0
x, sx),
L(bhx) = (a
h
x, ax→y, ah−1x ) where 1 ≤ h ≤ d(x) and y = n(x, h),
L(ahx) = (b
h+1
x , b
h
x) where 0 ≤ h < d(x),
L(a
d(x)
x ) = (b
d(x)
x ),
L(chx) = (dx),
L(dx) = (c
1
x, c
2
x, sx),
L(s{x,y}) = (bx→y, by→x) where x precedes y,
L(bx→y) = (ax→y, s{x,y}),
L(ax→y) = (bx→y, bhx) where y = n(x, h).
h ∈ {0, . . . , d(x)}. In this case, c1x, c
2
x are unmatched by M , both forming a blocking pair
with dx. By contrast, all of the men b
0
x, . . . , b
d(x)
x get their first choices.
Next, for each x ∈ V (G) \ S we set M(sx) = b
0
x, M(c
1
x) = dx, and M(a
h
x) = b
h+1
x for each
h ∈ {0, . . . , d(x) − 1}. Note that a
d(x)
x is unmatched by M , and thus forms a blocking pair
with b
d(x)
x . Observe also that dx is not contained in any blocking pair.
Finally, for some {x, y} ∈ E(G), let us assume y ∈ S (since S is a vertex cover, it contains x
or y). We set M(s{x,y}) = by→x and M(ax→y) = bx→y. Note that ax→y gets her first choice, so
it cannot be involved in a blocking pair. Although ay→x is unmatched by M , we know that it
cannot form a blocking pair with bℓy where x = n(y, ℓ), because y ∈ S and hence b
ℓ
y is assigned
her first choice by M . Thus, no man or woman of some edge gadget participates in a blocking
pair, and therefore we obtain that the total number of blocking pairs forM is exactly |V (G)|+k.
Since M is feasible, the theorem follows.
6.2 Covering constraints on both sides
Let us now investigate the complexity of SMC with covering constraints both for men and
women. If we restrict the maximum length of preference lists on both sides to be at most 2,
SMC becomes linear-time solvable; this follows from the observation that by max(∆W ,∆M) ≤ 2,
the graph underlying the instance is a collection of paths and cycles.
Observation 2. Instances of SMC with max(∆W ,∆M) ≤ 2 are polynomial-time solvable.
Recall that the case where ∆W = 2 and ∆M = 3 is NP-hard by Theorem 9, even if there are
no distinguished men to be covered. However, switching the role of men and women, Theorem 8
shows that if there are no women to be covered, then ∆W ≤ 2 guarantees polynomial-time
solvability for SMC. This raises the natural question whether SMC with ∆W ≤ 2 can be solved
efficiently if the number of distinguished women is bounded. Next we show that this is unlikely,
as the problem turns out to be NP-hard for |W⋆| = 1.
Theorem 10. SMC is NP-hard, even if ∆W = 2, ∆M = 3 and |W⋆| = 1.
Proof. We present a reduction from the following special case of Exact-3-Cover. We are
given a set U = {u1, . . . , un}, a family S of subsets S1, . . . , Sm of U , each having size 3, such
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Table 5: Preference lists of women and men in the proof of Theorem 10. We denote by ind(j, h)
the index i for which ui is the h-th element in Sj . When not stated otherwise, indices take all
possible values.
L(x0) = (xˆ1),
L(xj) = (xˆj+1, xˆj) for 1 ≤ j < m,
L(xm) = (xˆm, y),
L(sj) = (pˆ
3
j , xˆj),
L(p1j ) = (pˆ
1
j , tj),
L(phj ) = (pˆ
h−1
j , pˆ
h
j ) for h ∈ {2, 3},
L(qj) = (qˆj , tj),
L(ai,j) = (bˆi,j , pˆ
h
j ) for h ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i = ind(j, h),
L(bi,j) = (bˆi,j , ci),
L(xˆj) = (xj , sj , xj−1),
L(y) = (xm),
L(tj) = (p
1
j , qj),
L(pˆhj ) = (p
h
j , ai,j , p
h+1
j ) for h ∈ {1, 2} and i = ind(j, h),
L(pˆ3j ) = (p
3
j , ai,j, sj) for h ∈ {1, 2} and i = ind(j, 3),
L(qˆj) = (qj),
L(bˆi,j) = (bi,j , ai,j),
L(ci) = ([Bi]) where Bi = {bi,j | ui ∈ Sj} and [Bi] is some fixed ordering of Bi.
that each element of U occurs in at most three sets of S. The task is to decide whether there
exists a collection of n/3 sets in S whose union covers U ; such a collection of subsets is called
an exact cover for U . This problem is NP-complete [20, GT2]. We construct an equivalent
instance I of SMC as follows.
The set W of women in I contains the women sj, p
1
j , p
2
j , p
3
j , and qj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
women x0, x1, . . . , xm, and two women ai,j, bi,j for each element ui contained in Sj for each j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. The men defined in I are xˆj, pˆ
1
j , pˆ
2
j , pˆ
3
j , qˆj, and tj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, a man ci
for each ui ∈ U , a man bˆi,j for each element ui contained in Sj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, plus
one additional man y. (The pairs {w, wˆ} form a stable matching in I.) The only distinguished
woman in I is x0, and the set of distinguished men is M
⋆ = {ci | i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {xˆj, tj | j =
1, . . . ,m} ∪ {y}. The preferences of each person are as shown in Table 5. Note that since each
subset Sj contains three elements, and each element ui is contained in at most three subsets
from S, the constructed instance satisfies ∆M ≤ 3. To finish the construction, we set the
number of allowed blocking pairs to be b = 2m+ 2n/3 + 1.
We claim that I admits a feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs if and only if
(U,S) is a “yes”-instance of Exact-3-Cover.
“⇒”: Suppose M is a feasible matching for I with at most b blocking pairs. First, observe
that since every xˆj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, but also x0 is distinguished, M must contain the edges
{xj , xˆj+1} for each j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} as well as the edge {xm, y}. Thus, {xm, xˆm} is blocking
21
in M . Second, since tj is distinguished for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we get that M matches tj
either to qj or to p
1
j , which in turn implies that either {qj, qˆj} or {p
1
j , pˆ
1
j} blocks M , leading to
m additional blocking pairs for M . Third, consider now any man ci, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: as ci is
distinguished, we know M(ci) = bi,j for some j such that Sj contains ui. In this case, {bi,j , bˆi,j}
is also a blocking pair for M , yielding n blocking pairs of such form. Thus, if bU denotes the
number of blocking pairs among the edges {bi,j, bˆi,j} for indices i and j with ui ∈ Sj, then we
get bU ≥ n.
Let us define now the set Ej of those edges that are incident to sj , pˆ
3
j , p
3
j , pˆ
2
j , or p
2
j for
some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; note that these sets are pairwise disjoint, and none of them contains any
of the (possibly) blocking edges mentioned in the previous paragraph. Let k be the number of
indices j for which Ej contains no blocking pairs forM ; we call such indices (and the subsets Sj
corresponding to them) selected. The m− k non-selected indices clearly correspond to at least
m− k blocking pairs for M (each contained in Ej for some j).
Suppose now that j is selected. Then, since {sj, xˆj} is not blocking, we get M(sj) = pˆ
3
j .
This shows that M(p3j ) = pˆ
2
j , as otherwise {p
3
j , pˆ
3
j} would be blocking in M . Similarly, from
this we obtain M(p2j ) = pˆ
1
j . Moreover, for each h ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to ensure that {pˆ
h
j , ai,j} does not
block M where ui is the h-th element of Sj , we must have M(ai,j) = bˆi,j. This implies that
{bi,j , bˆi,j} must be blocking in M . Since this holds for each h ∈ {1, 2, 3} and each selected j, we
get bU ≥ 3k.
Summing up the blocking pairs identified so far, we know that M admits at least 1 +
m + (m − k) + max(n, 3k) blocking pairs. Using that this must be upper-bounded by b =
1 +m+ n+ (m− n/3), it is easy to show that only k = n/3 is possible. This yields that there
exist exactly n/3 selected indices, and for all such indices j all the edges {bi,j, bˆi,j} for which
ui ∈ Sj are blocking w.r.t. M . Moreover, we also must have bU = n, as otherwise the number
of blocking pairs would exceed b.
However, observe that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there must exist some j with ui ∈ Sj for
which the pair {bi,j , bˆi,j} is blocking in M (because ui is distinguished), implying that for each
ui ∈ U there must exist some selected Sj that contains ui. Since there are exactly n/3 selected
sets in S, we get that they form an exact covering of U .
“⇐”: Suppose that (U,S) is a “yes”-instance of Exact-3-Cover. Let J be the set of
indices describing a solution, meaning that the subsets Sj ∈ S with j ∈ J form an exact
covering of U ; clearly, |J | = n/3. We define σ(i) as the unique index j in J for which ui ∈ Sj.
We define a feasible matching M for I with exactly b blocking pairs as follows (indices take all
possible values, if not stated otherwise).
M(xˆj) = xj−1, M(tj) = qj if j /∈ J ,
M(y) = xm, M(tj) = p
1
j if j ∈ J ,
M(ci) = bi,σ(i), M(pˆ
h
j ) = p
h+1
j if j ∈ J , h ∈ {1, 2},
M(bˆi,σ(i)) = ai,σ(i), M(pˆ
3
j) = sj if j ∈ J ,
M(wˆ) = w if w ∈ W and neither M(w) nor M(wˆ) is defined yet.
It is easy to check that M indeed is feasible, and the blocking pairs it admits are exactly the
pairs {xm, xˆm}, {bi,σ(i), bˆi,σ(i)} for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, {p
1
j , pˆ
1
j} for each j ∈ J , {q
1
j , qˆ
1
j } for each
j /∈ J , and {sj , xˆj} for each j /∈ J . This proves the lemma.
Contrasting Theorem 10, we establish fixed-parameter tractability of the case ∆W ≤ 2 with
two different parameterizations. Considering our five parameters, the relevant cases (whose
tractability or intractability does not follow from our results obtained so far) are as follows
(assuming ∆W ≤ 2 throughout). First, we can take the number of distinguished persons as
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parameter (note that we know NP-hardness of the cases where |W⋆| = 1 or |M⋆| = 0). Second,
we can consider the number of blocking pairs as the parameter. We show fixed-parameter
tractability for both parameterizations.
Theorem 11. There is a fixed-parameter algorithm for the special case of SMC where each
woman finds at most two men acceptable (i.e., ∆W ≤ 2), with parameter the number |W⋆0 |+|M
⋆
0|
of distinguished men and women left unmatched by some stable matching.
High-level description. Let us remark first that simply guessing the optimal partners for
each man in M⋆0 and then using the polynomial algorithm presented in Section 6.1 does not
work, since that algorithm heavily relies on the assumption that we start with a stable matching.
In fact, the main difficulty to overcome is that feminine and masculine augmenting paths may
“interact” in the sense that certain blocking pairs introduced by a feminine augmenting path
can be “eliminated” (i.e., made non-blocking again) by an appropriately chosen masculine path.
Therefore, we apply the following strategy. In Phase I, we find all feminine paths (as well as
cycles) in Ms△M
opt, and in Phase II we proceed with choosing the masculine paths carefully.
Note that in Phase I it does not suffice to find a cheapest set of feminine augmenting paths,
since we may not be able to eliminate as many blocking pairs afterwards as is it possible after
an optimal choice of feminine paths. Instead, we need to find the exact feminine augmenting
paths (and cycles) present inMs△M
opt; this can be accomplished by guessing certain properties
of Mopt.
In Phase II, the main obstacle is that we do not know which blocking edges should be
eliminated in an optimal solution, nor can we guess these edges efficiently. We deal with
this problem by guessing the sets of those men in M⋆0 whose augmenting paths in Ms△M
opt
contribute to the elimination of a blocking pair; this information allows us to find these masculine
paths. Finally, we apply the algorithm of Theorem 8.
For the detailed description of our algorithm, we need a couple of simple observations and
some additional notation. We begin with the following implications of the fact that each woman
finds at most two men acceptable.
Proposition 2. Let P1 and P2 be two augmenting paths.
(a) If P1 and P2 start at some w ∈ W
⋆
0 through the same edge, then one of them is a subpath
of the other.
(b) If P1 and P2 start at different women w1 and w2, resp., and P1 and P2 are not disjoint,
then the set of their common vertices induces a suffix of either P1 or P2 (or both); their
first common vertex is a man.
(c) If P1 and P2 are disjoint and e is an edge incident to both, then one of the paths starts or
ends at a women w, and e connects w with a man on the other path.
Let Mopt denote an optimal solution for our instance I such that Ms△M
opt contains the
minimum number of edges; recall that Ms is a fixed stable matching for I. Let b be the number
of blocking pairs in Mopt.
We say that an edge f = {m,w} of G (with m ∈ M and w ∈ W) is dependent if it
connects two different connected components K1 and K2 ofMs△M
opt and, in addition, it holds
that Ms△K1 admits more blocking pairs than Ms△(K1 ∪K2). We will say that f , and with a
slight abuse of the notation, also K1 relies on K2. By claim (c) of Proposition 2, this is only
possible in the following two scenarios, depicted in Fig. 5:
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• f has type A: w is the endpoint of K2 (which must be a path), f connects w with a
man m on K1 that prefers Ms(m) to w, and w to M
opt(m), and w is unmatched by Ms
and prefers Mopt(w) to m;
• f has type B : w is the endpoint of K1 (which must be a path), unmatched by M
opt, and f
connects w with a man m on K2 that prefers M
opt(m) to w, and w to Ms(m).
type A:
K1 :
K2 :
. . .
m
w
2
1
. . .
. . .
f
type B:
K1 :
K2 :
. . . w1
2
m
. . . . . .
f
Figure 5: Illustration of a dependent edge f , running between two connected components K1
and K2 of Ms△M
opt where K1 relies on K2. Throughout the paper, we use squares for women,
circles for men; distinguished persons are denoted by filled squares/circles. The numbering
of edges incident to some vertex (or, sometimes, arrows between edges) indicate preferences.
Further, double lines here denote edges of Ms, single lines denote edges of M
opt, and f is drawn
with a dashed line.
We are now ready to present our algorithm, which is a branching algorithm: throughout its
course, we make several “guesses” for which all possibilities have to be explored. When certain
guesses turn out to be trivially wrong, such guesses are discarded, and we might not explicitly
mention this in the algorithm. (In Step 1, we describe such issues in detail for illustration, but
later we omit them.) Phase I and II consist of Steps 1-5 and Steps 6-8, resp.
Step 1: Guessing the first edges of augmenting paths. First, for each w ∈ W⋆0 with
|L(w)| = 2, we guess the edge ofMopt incident to w. This results in at most 2|W
⋆
0 | possibilities, all
of which must be explored. Naturally, we discard those guesses where the edges {w,Mopt(w)},
w ∈ W⋆0 , do not form a matching. From now on we assume that we know M
opt(w) for each
w ∈ W⋆0 .
Additionally, we delete those edges {m,w} for which w ∈ W⋆0 and w prefers M
opt(w) to m.
Such edges are neither needed in Mopt, nor can they block any matching that contains all the
edges {w,Mopt(w)}, w ∈ W⋆0 , guessed in this step.
Before proceeding to Step 2, we state an important lemma about augmenting paths.
Lemma 3. All maximal paths in Ms△M
opt are augmenting paths. Further, assume that Step 1
has already been performed, and K1 and K2 are connected components ofMs△M
opt such that K1
relies on K2 via a dependent edge f . Then
(a) if f has type A, then K2 is a masculine path and not a feminine path;
(b) if f has type B, then K1 is a feminine path, and K2 is either a cycle or a feminine path.
Proof. For contradiction, let us first suppose that Q is a maximal path in Ms△M
opt that is not
an augmenting path. The feasibility ofMopt implies that if Q has a distinguished person p as its
endpoint, then p must be unmatched by Ms. This means that Q can only be non-augmenting
if neither of its endpoints is distinguished. This implies that MQ := M
opt△Q is a feasible
matching. Recall that b is the number of blocking pairs Mopt admits. If MQ admits at most b
blocking pairs as well, then this contradicts to the choice of Mopt, because there are strictly less
edges in Ms△MQ than in Ms△M
opt.
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Hence, Mopt△Q admits at least b+1 blocking pairs. It is easy to see that since Ms is stable
and Q is a path, there must be an edge along Q that blocks Mopt. By contrast, there is no
edge on Q that blocks Ms, since Ms is stable. Hence, modifying M
opt by switching the edges
of Ms and M
opt along Q can only increase the number of blocking pairs if there are at least two
dependent edges relying on Q. Clearly, one of these must have type B.
Let us call the man endpoint of a type B dependent edge a joiner ; by the previous para-
graph, Q contains at least one joiner. Let us fix an “outer-most” joiner m on Q. More precisely,
we choose m so that the following holds: if m splits Q into two subpaths Q1 and Q2 with Q1
containing Mopt(m), then Q1 contains no other joiners. Now, there might be several women
who form a dependent edge with m, so let w denote the one that is most preferred by m. Let f
be the edge {m,w}, and let P be the path ofMs△M
opt that has w as its endpoint. We illustrate
these concepts in Fig. 6.
Q :
P :
. . .
y
1 2 m . . .
. . .
w
Q1 } Q2 }
f
Figure 6: The joiner m splits Q into subpaths Q1 and Q2. Here and in later figures, double
lines denote edges of Ms. Single lines denote edges of M
opt, and dashed lines are for dependent
edges.
We claim that Mf = M
opt△(Q1 ∪ {f}) is an optimal solution. Observe that Ms△Mf can
be obtained from Ms△M
opt by deleting Q and substituting P by the path P + f +Q2 (where
the plus sign means concatenation). Let x denote the endpoint of Q1 that is not m. First, Mf
is clearly feasible, since x is not in W⋆0 . Next, observe that by the stability of Ms, the only edge
that may become blocking in Mf (and is not blocking in M
opt) is a possible dependent edge of
type A incident to x. If indeed there exists such an edge, then x must be a woman not covered
by Ms. Moreover, since f is a dependent edge of type B, we know that m prefers y =M
opt(m)
to Ms(m), and hence, y must prefer Ms(y) to m. However, it is then straightforward to check
that Q1 must contain at least one edge that blocks M
opt, and this edge clearly is not blocking
in Mf . (Note also the implication that Q1 has at least two edges.) Thus, the number of edges
blocking Mf cannot be more than b. Hence, Mf is an optimal solution such that there are less
edges in Ms△Mf than in Ms△M
opt, a contradiction. This proves the first statement of the
lemma.
Let us prove (b) now. Suppose that K1 and K2 are two connected components of Ms△M
opt
such that K1 relies on K2 via an edge f = {w,m} of type B. It is immediate that K1 cannot be
a masculine path, so by the first statement of the lemma, it is feminine. It remains to show that
if K2 is path, then it is feminine. Assume for contradiction that K2 is a non-feminine path Q
in Ms△M
opt and some other path P in Ms△M
opt relies on Q via a type B edge f . In this case
we can argue exactly as above to show that there must exist an optimal matching Mf (defined
the same way as we did while proving the first statement of the lemma) for which Ms△Mf
contains less edges than Ms△M
opt, a contradiction.
To show (a), suppose that K1 and K2 are two connected components of Ms△M
opt such
that K1 relies on K2 via an edge f = {w,m} of type A. By the definition of a type A edge,
the woman endpoint w of f is unmatched in Ms, and K2 is a path that has w as an endpoint.
Also, m is the second choice of w and Mopt(w) is the first choice of w. Hence w ∈ W⋆0 is
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2
mx
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P optw{
Figure 7: Step 2 of the algorithm for Theorem 11, for finding cycles in M△Mopt.
not possible, as in that case the edge f would have been deleted in Step 1 of the algorithm.
Furthermore, since K2 is an Ms-alternating path with an endpoint in W0, the other endpoint
of K2 cannot be a woman in W0. Hence, Q2 is not a feminine augmenting path. Since we
already know that K2 is an augmenting path, (a) follows.
By Lemma 3, each maximal path in Ms△M
opt is an augmenting path; we let P optx denote
the augmenting path in Ms△M
opt that contains some x ∈ W⋆0 ∪M
⋆
0 as an endpoint.
Step 2: Finding cycles in Ms△M
opt. We make one more guess for each w ∈ W⋆0 by guessing
whether P optw relies on some cycle of Ms△M
opt or not. If P optw relies on some cycle C, then by
Proposition 2, both P optw and C can be found in time O(|P
opt
w | + |C|) by simply following the
longest alternating path starting with the edge {w,Mopt(w)}: the last person on this path Q
must be a woman x incident to an edge {x,m} for which m is on Q, and the subpath of Q
between m and x together with the edge {x,m} form the cycle C. For an illustration, see Fig. 7.
By the choice of Mopt, any cycle in Ms△M
opt must be incident to at least one dependent
edge of type B, relying on the cycle (recall that dependent edges of type A rely on paths).
Furthermore, by Lemma 3 we also know that all paths relying on a cycle must be feminine
paths. Hence, all cycles in Ms△M
opt and all paths relying on them are found in this step.
Step 3: Finding neutral paths. In this step, for each w ∈ W⋆0 we guess whether w lies on a
neutral path in Ms△M
opt. Clearly, if w lies on a neutral path, then P optw must be the unique
longest augmenting path starting with the edge {w,Mopt(w)} by Proposition 2.
Step 4: Finding feminine paths relying on other feminine paths. In this step, we first
guess for each w ∈ W⋆0 whether P
opt
w relies on another feminine path, and if so, we also guess
on which one. Supposing that, according to our guesses, P optw relies on P
opt
y for some w and y
in W⋆0 , we can find P
opt
w easily: by Lemma 3, we know that P
opt
w and P
opt
y are connected by a
dependent edge f of type B, and by Proposition 2, there may exist only one such edge, implying
that f and P optw can be found in O(|P
opt
w |+ |P
opt
y |) time. To ensure that P
opt
y indeed contains
the man m incident to f , we store m as an obligatory man for y.
Step 5: Finding all remaining feminine paths. LetWr be the set of those women w ∈ W
⋆
0
for which P optw has not been found yet. For each w ∈ Wr we define two paths. First, we
let Q1w be the shortest augmenting path starting with the edge {w,M
opt(w)} that contains all
obligatory men for w. Second, let Q2w be the shortest augmenting path containing Q
1
w such that
Ms△Q
2
w admits less blocking pairs than Ms△Q
1
w.
Lemma 4. If P optw does not rely on any other path or cycle inMs△M
opt, then either P optw = Q1w
or P optw = Q2w.
Proof. First observe that for any w ∈ Wr, if the guesses made by the algorithm are correct,
then P optw contains Q1w as a subpath. To see this, recall that if the guesses made in Step 4 of the
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algorithm are correct, then P optw indeed must contain all obligatory men for w (and it clearly is
an augmenting path), proving that P optw indeed contains Q1w.
Next, suppose that P optw 6= Q1w, and consider the matching M1 = (M
opt△P optw )△Q1w (in
other words, replace P optw with Q1w in the difference of Ms and the solution). By Lemma 3,
only feminine paths may rely on P optw . Since Q1w contains all the obligatory men for w, we get
that all paths that rely on P optw in Ms△M
opt rely on Q1w in Ms△M1 as well (assuming correct
guesses in Step 4). Using this and the stability of Ms, it follows that an edge that is blocking
in M1 but is not blocking in M
opt must be incident to the last person x on Q1w; note that x
must be a woman (since Q1w is an augmenting path, but not a maximal one).
Let c1 denote the number of blocking pairs with respect to M1 that are incident to a man or
woman on Q1w, and let c
opt be the number of pairs with respect to Mopt that are incident to a
man or woman on P optw . We claim copt = c1 − 1. Clearly, c
opt < c1, as otherwise M1 would also
be an optimal solution which would contradict our choice of Mopt (as Ms△M1 contains less
edges that Ms△M
opt). From this, we immediately have that Ms△P
opt
w admits less blocking
pairs than Ms△Q
1
w. On the other hand, c
opt ≤ c1 − 2 can only happen if both edges incident
to x are blocking inM1, and none of them is blocking inM
opt. However, this cannot happen, as
we are going to show now. Let m1 =Ms(x) and m2 =M
opt(x) be the two men in x’s preference
list (note that Q1w contains m1 but not m2). If both {x,m1} and {x,m2} are blocking in M1,
then m1 prefers x to M
opt(m1), and m2 prefers x to Ms(m2). The latter (and the stability
of Ms) implies that x prefers m1 to m2. But this shows that {x,m1} is a blocking pair in M
opt
as well, proving our claim.
Thus, the number of blocking pairs incident to P optw inMopt is only one less than the number
of blocking pairs incident to Q1w in M1. Also, by the arguments of the previous paragraph,
choosing an augmenting path that is even longer than Q2w cannot further decrease the number
of blocking pairs. Hence, by the choice of Mopt, we get that P optw must be equal to Q2w.
According to Lemma 4, we can find all remaining feminine paths in Ms△M
opt, by guessing
for each w ∈ Wr whether P
opt
w equals Q1w or Q
2
w.
Step 6: Computing elimination paths. Let F be the union of cycles, feminine and neutral
paths found in Steps 1 to 5. When searching for masculine paths, we will have to deal with
edges that might be type A dependent edges in the optimum solution. We call an edge volatile
if it connects a woman inW0 with her second choice. The importance of this definition is shown
by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If f is a volatile edge incident to some non-feminine path in Ms△M
opt, then f is
not blocking in Mopt.
Proof. Recall thatMopt is an optimal solution for whichMs△M
opt has as few edges as possible.
Without loss of generality, we can further assume that there does not exist another optimal
solution M ′ with the same number of edges in Ms△Mopt in which for each man m, either
M ′(m) = Mopt(m) or m prefers M ′(m) to Mopt(m) (as otherwise we can pick M ′ instead
of Mopt).
Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that f is a volatile edge incident to a masculine path P optx
in Ms△M
opt and f blocks Mopt. Let m and w be the man and woman connected by f . First
observe that w does not lie on P optx , as in that case w would get its first choice by Mopt,
and f would not be blocking. Therefore, m lies on P optx . Since f is blocking in Mopt, we know
that Mopt does not cover w.
Define P as the subpath of P optx from x to m plus the edge f . Consider now the matching
Mf = M
opt△(P optx △P ). Clearly, Mf is feasible, since P
opt
x is not a feminine path. Further-
more, f is not blocking in Mf , and there can be at most one new blocking edge f
′ in Mf that
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does not blockMopt. Moreover, if such an edge f ′ exists, then P optx must end at some woman w′
in W0 and f
′ must be a volatile edge incident to w′. Let us call this modification the filtering
of f ; observe that the modified matching admits at most as many blocking pairs as Mopt.
Let us repeat the above procedure until it is no longer applicable: while there exists a volatile
edge e that is blocking in the actual matching M but was not blocking in Mopt (there can be
only one such e), filter e if it is incident to a non-feminine masculine path in Ms△M , and stop
otherwise. Clearly, this process terminates (as at each step we either make a masculine paths
shorter, or match its last man with a better partner). In the end, we clearly arrive at an optimal
matching that has either more common edges with Ms than M
opt, or in which all men are as
happy as in Mopt, both cases contradicting our choice of Mopt.
For any volatile edge f , we can decide in linear time if there exists a masculine augmenting
path disjoint from F that contains the woman endpoint of f but does not contain f itself. If
such a path exists, then it is unique by Proposition 1 and we denote it by Qf . Let f be a
volatile edge that is blocking in Ms△F . We say that a set Pf of masculine augmenting paths
eliminates f if (i) Qf exists and Qf ∈ Pf , and (ii) for any path Q ∈ Pf , if there is a volatile
blocking edge f ′ in Ms△Q, then Qf ′ exists and is contained in Pf . We refer to the (inclusion-
wise) minimal set of masculine paths eliminating f as the elimination paths for f , and denote
it by Pelimf . Further, we refer to the starting vertices of these paths as the elimination set for f .
Step 7: Guessing relevant elimination sets in Mopt. We call an edge relevant in Mopt, if
it is a volatile edge blockingMs△F , but it does not blockM
opt. By Lemma 5 and the definition
of elimination sets, we know that if f is a relevant edge in Mopt, then Ms△M
opt must contain
all paths in Pelimf , to ensure that there are no volatile edges incident to masculine paths that
block Mopt. Since there may be several volatile edges blocking in Ms△F , we cannot determine
the relevant ones among them by simply guessing them. Instead, we only guess the elimination
sets for all relevant edges. Clearly, these sets must be pairwise disjoint subsets of M⋆0, let
R1, . . . , Rℓ denote them.
Step 8: Computing cheapest masculine paths. First, for each set Ri ⊆ M
⋆
0 with i =
1, . . . , ℓ that, according to our guesses made in Step 7, forms the elimination set for some volatile
edge f relevant in Mopt, we determine some volatile edge f incident to F that is blocking in
Ms△F and whose elimination set is exactly Ri. Namely, we pick an edge f among all such
edges in a way that the number of blocking pairs in Ms△(F ∪ P
elim
f ) is as small as possible.
Let fi be the volatile edge chosen this way, and let P
elim =
⋃
1≤i≤ℓ P
elim
fi
.
Next, letMr =M
⋆
0 \(R1∪· · ·∪Rℓ) be the set of distinguished men that are neither covered
by Ms nor contained in any of the sets R1, . . . , Rℓ. It remains to determine an augmenting path
for each m ∈ Mr. Thus, for each such m we compute an augmenting path Pm disjoint from F
such that the number of blocking pairs in Ms△Pr is minimized, where Pr is the union of all
paths Pm for some m ∈Mr. For this, we use the algorithm of Theorem 8 restricted to consider
only masculine augmenting paths disjoint from F , and switching the roles of men and women.
Finally, we output the matching Mout =Ms△(F ∪ P
elim ∪ Pr).
It is straightforward to verify that the number of guesses made are bounded by a function
of |W⋆0 |+ |M
⋆
0|, and all computations in a branch can be performed in time polynomial in the
size |I| of the instance, yielding a fixed-parameter algorithm. It remains to prove the correctness
of the proposed algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 11. To prove the correctness of the proposed algorithm, we first show that
if all our guesses are true, then the paths and cycles in F are exactly the feminine paths and
the cycles of Ms△M
opt. From the description of our algorithm, it should be clear that the
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correctness of Steps 2, 3, and 4 follows directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma 3. Lemma 4
guarantees the correctness of Step 5, which proves that in Steps 1-5 the algorithm indeed finds
all cycles and feminine paths of Ms△M
opt.
Next, let us argue that Mout is indeed a matching. For this, apart from the correctness of
Steps 1 to 5, we need that the masculine paths in Ms△M
out are disjoint from F . In addition,
we also need that paths in Pelim are disjoint from all remaining masculine paths. To see this,
observe that each such path P ends at a woman w ∈ W0 which is connected by a volatile edge
(not on P ) to either F or to another path in Pelim. Hence, w cannot lie on any masculine path
other than P by Proposition 1. Thus, Mout is a matching. Its feasibility is implied by the
correctness of Steps 1 to 5, and the definition of augmenting paths.
It remains to argue thatMout admits at most as many blocking pairs asMopt. First, observe
that all edges blocking in Ms△F are either relevant volatile edges in M
opt, or they are also
blocking in Mopt. Assuming our guesses in Step 7 are correct, there are exactly ℓ relevant
volatile edges in Mopt. Furthermore, if ei is a relevant edge with elimination set Ri for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, then by Lemma 5 we know that all elimination paths in Pelimei must be contained
in Ms△M
opt. Hence, in Step 8 the algorithm is bound to find some volatile edge fi (though
not necessarily ei), that is blocking in Ms△F and whose elimination set is Ri. Clearly, by the
definition of elimination paths, fi is not blocking in M
out. Thus, there are at least ℓ volatile
edges blocking in Ms△F but not blocking in M
out.
It remains to count the number of blocking pairs in Mout adjacent only to masculine paths.
First, by our choice of ei, there are at most as many blocking pairs in M
out incident to paths
in Pelimfi , as there are in M
opt incident to paths in Pelimei . Therefore, the number of blocking
pairs in Ms△(F ∪ P
elim) is at most the number of blocking pairs in Ms△(F ∪
⋃
1≤i≤ℓ P
elim)ei .
Second, as the algorithm of Theorem 8 is correct, the total number of blocking pairs in
Ms△Pr is at most the number of blocking pairs in M
opt incident to the paths P optm , m ∈ Mr.
Observe that no augmenting path inMs△M
opt that does not start inMr can rely on a path P
opt
m
for some m ∈ Mr, so we can indeed choose augmenting paths starting from the men in Mr
independently from the rest of the solution. The optimality of Mout follows.
As each augmenting path contains at least one edge that blocksMopt, the number of blocking
pairs admitted by Mopt is at least (|W⋆0 |+ |M
⋆
0|)/2. Thus, we get Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. There is a fixed-parameter algorithm with parameter b for the special case of
SMC where each woman finds at most two men acceptable (i.e., ∆W ≤ 2).
7 Discussion
We provided a systematic study of the computational complexity of Stable Marriage with
Covering Constraints. Our main result is a complete computational complexity trichotomy
into polynomial-time solvable cases, NP-hard and fixed-parameter tractable cases, and NP-hard
and W[1]-hard cases, for all possible combinations of five natural parameters:
• |M⋆|: the number of distinguished men,
• |W⋆|: the number of distinguished women,
• ∆M: the maximum length of preference lists for men,
• ∆W : the maximum length of preference lists for women, and
• b: the number of blocking pairs allowed.
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b constant? P (Observ. 1)
min{∆M,∆W} ≤ 2?|W⋆| = 0?
∆M ≤ 2?
b parameter?
|M⋆|+ |W⋆|
P (Thm. 8R)
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FPT (Cor. 3)
most restricted case:
|M⋆| = 0,∆M = 3,∆W =
2;
NP-hard (Thm. 9)
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|W⋆| = 1,∆M = 3,∆W =
2;
NP-hard (Thm. 10)
|W⋆| constant?
most restricted case:
|M⋆| = 0,∆M = ∆W = 3,
param. b+ |W⋆|;
W[1]-hard (Thm. 2)
|M⋆|+ |W⋆| = 0?P (Gale-Shapley alg.)
∆M constant?
|M⋆| = 0?
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|M⋆| = 1, |W⋆| = 0,∆M = 3,
param. b+∆W ;
W[1]-hard (Thm. 5R)
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|M⋆| = 0, |W⋆| = 1,∆W = 3,
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W[1]-hard (Thm. 5)
P (Thm. 11) FPT (Thm. 11)
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Figure 8: Decision diagram for determining the complexity of SMC. We remark that if a certain restriction of SMC where one of the values
v ∈ S is a constant k proves to be NP-hard or W[1]-hard with some parameterization, then it is easy to see that the same hardness result
also holds for the case where v ≥ k (and all other assumptions are the same). We refer to the “reflection” of a result by adding the postfix
‘R’ to its name (so Theorem xR denotes the reflection of Theorem x); here by reflection we mean the statement obtained by switching the
roles of men and women.
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As a special case, we solved a problem by Hamada et al. [23].
Fig. 8 provides a decision diagram showing that our results indeed fully determine the
computational complexity of SMC with respect to the set S = {b, |W⋆|, |M⋆|,∆M,∆W} of
possible parameters. Going through this decision diagram should convince the reader that any
parameterized restriction of SMC with respect to the set S is classified as either polynomial-time
solvable (P) or NP-hard, and in the latter case, either fixed-parameter tractable (FPT), or W[1]-
hard with the given parameterization (if any). In particular, when we provide parameterized
results, this means that the parameterized restriction of SMC in question is NP-hard without
parameterization.
Given the strong polynomial-time inapproximability bounds, as well as the parameterized
intractability results of this paper, we pose as an open question whether fixed-parameter ap-
proximation algorithms can beat either of these obstacles for solving SMC.
Another challenge for future research is to investigate possible adaptations of the proposed
algorithms to the Hospitals/Residents model (note that, naturally, all our hardness results for
SMC-1 apply to the HRLQ problem), or to a setting where ties are allowed in the preference
lists.
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